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This article traces the way modern institutions emerged in one region of British-ruled India, the 
Godavari delta of coastal Andhra, during the early nineteenth century. Rejecting recently popular 
cultural theories and the vague language of ‘multiple modernities’, it suggests that modernity can be 
defined as the practical effort to govern subjects perceived as strangers with abstract and general 
categories. But, arguing that our conception of modernity needs to be limited, the article suggests 
that modern institutions always rely on non-modern ways of life: the rule of law depends on ideas 
about individual honour; bureaucracy on family connections and affective idioms of loyalty; rational 
interests are coordinated by archaic idioms of political leadership. The peculiarity history of 
modernity in imperial India was marked not by the limited or partial imposition of modern practices, 
but by the British regime’s reluctance to accept the legitimacy of the very non-modern forms of 
power it’s relied on. Tracing this process in the Godavari delta, the article shows how a regime with 
limited local resources asserted the monopolistic authority of its structures of government, but in 
doing so it corroded its own capacity to exercise power. Local institutions which had coordinated 
local productive resources were undermined, but alternative forms of local leadership were unable to 
emerge. The consequence was famine in the 1830s, and an effort to refound the imperial regime in 
the 1840s by imposing British power on the region’s natural resources.  
 
The last seventy years have seen the rise, fall and strange survival of modernity as 
an essential category in the way scholars try to understand change in both European 
and non-European societies. Recent debates emerge from the wreckage of a story 
about the world’s transition to modernity dominant in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, 
modernisation theory twisted complex and often profoundly pessimistic strands of 
early twentieth century European thought, particularly the work of Max Weber, into 
an optimistic, all-encompassing narrative. That narrative could be could be joined 
by every part of the rapidly decolonising world could participate in, albeit at 
different moments in time. In this post-war story, modernity was many things at 
one moment. It encompassed formal beliefs such as individualism and secularism, 
attitudes like the work ethic, institutions (the rule of law, markets and democracy), 
material practices (industrial production) and technologies (road, steamships). As 
the proponent of a late version of modernisation theory Samuel P. Huntingdon mid- 
described it, modernity is ‘a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of 
human thought and activity’.1 
From the late 1960s, the intellectual power and coherence of this unitary concept 
of modernity collapsed. As David Washbrook summarises it, the critique involved 
three arguments. First, the violent reality of the twentieth century broke apart the 
idea of a monolithic unitary modernity in which culture, institutions and 
technologies all progressed at the same even pace. Second, historical research and 
contemporary analysis both noticed the endurance of supposedly traditional pre-
modern forms of life into modern societies, craft production or religious 
institutions, for example. Finally, modernity’s apparent universality started to be 
identified merely as an effect of European and North American power.2 
Despite the apparent devastation these criticisms wrought on the concept, 
scholars have refused to kick the modernity habit. A once dominant category has 
been fractured and reshaped, but it has remained vital to the way scholars think 
about change in South Asia and beyond. Revisions have taken two forms. One 
group of scholars retained the idea of Europe as the starting point for a particular 
form of modernity. They then trace the complex, locally-rooted ways in which non-
Europeans responded to and reconstituted modern practices of life for themselves. 
From this point of view modernity itself was a holistic social and cultural system 
rooted in the particularities of European history. But it spawned ‘alternative 
modernities’ which opened up spaces for South Asian agency and autonomy.3 	  1	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntington,	  Political	  Order	  in	  Changing	  Societies	  (Yale	  University	  Press,	  1968),	  32;	  Founding	  texts	  of	  modernisation	  theory	  include	  Seymour	  Martin	  Lipset,	  “Some	  Social	  Requisites	  of	  Democracy,Economic	  Development	  and	  Political	  Legitimacy,”	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  53,	  no.	  1	  (1959),69–105;	  Talcott	  Parsons,	  The	  Structure	  of	  Social	  Action.	  A	  Study	  in	  Social	  Theory	  with	  Special	  
Reference	  to	  a	  Group	  of	  European	  Writers	  (New	  York,	  NY,McGraw-­‐‑Hill,	  1937),	  each	  of	  which	  attempted	  to	  integrate	  belief,	  institutions	  and	  practice	  into	  a	  single	  system.	  Parsons	  text	  was	  ignored	  until	  the	  1940s.	  Classic	  works	  on	  empire	  and	  India	  which	  use	  a	  similar	  framework	  include	  John	  Gallagher	  and	  Ronald	  Robinson,	  “The	  Imperialism	  of	  Free	  Trade,”	  The	  Economic	  History	  Review	  6,	  no.	  1	  (August	  1,	  1953),1–15;	  	  Bernard	  S.	  Cohn,	  “From	  Indian	  Status	  to	  British	  Contract,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  History	  21,	  no.	  4	  (December	  1961),613–628.	  2	  David	  Washbrook,	  “From	  Comparative	  Sociology	  to	  Global	  History:	  Britain	  and	  India	  in	  the	  Pre-­‐‑History	  of	  Modernity,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  of	  the	  Orient	  40,	  4	  (1997),	  413–16.	  3 P. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, NJ, 1993); Dilip 
Parameshwar Gaonkar, “On Alternative Modernities,” Public Culture 11, 1 (1999),1–18,  Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincialising Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ,  2000); K. 
A second set of scholars have revised the category of modernity to offer a more 
dispersed genealogy of the origins of the modern world. This group of early modern 
social and economic rather than modern cultural historians, led by David 
Washbrook, argue too that the expansion of empire subjected the rest of the world 
to ‘universaling and homogenising forces from Europe’. But Europe’s modernity 
was entangled within the growth of market economics and bureaucratic forms of 
government which already existed beyond Europe. David Washbrook and 
Prasannan Parthasarathi both connect British industrialisation to India’s prior 
centrality to the global production and exchange of textiles, for example. Similarly, 
the cultural forms of modern South Asian life, in the imperial age as much as now, 
are seen as being shaped by continuities which reach into the pre-imperial past as 
well as the response to forces from outside. Modernity, in this account, is not a 
single system but a complicated and inter-connected set of practices, mentalities 
and institutions that emerged at different places and different points in time.4 
These competing revisions of modernity offer superb analyses of particular 
places and processes. They have allowed the proliferation of rich and complex 
stories which narrate how life in particular parts of the world has been shaped by 
interactions with phenomena elsewhere, on many different planes of analysis. The 
paradox is that the turn to a global history concerned to trace connections across 
continents has weakened the power of universal categories of analysis. Modernity 
has become a vague and fuzzy category, so supple it ends up being almost 
impossible to define. One sign of this is its frequent modified by a confusing and 
ill-defined proliferation of adjectives: alternative, multi, proto, early modernity and 
so on. Each of these new categories is an attempt to get to grips with the specificity 
of life in a particular place. Each, too, silently implies that a non-adjectival form of 
modernity exists in a pure and unmodified form. But that form is never clearly 
defined. Clear definitions are needed for scholars of different ages and places to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sivaramakrishnan and Arun Agrawal, Regional Modernities: The Cultural Politics of Development in India 
(Stanford, CA, 2003). 4 David Washbrook, “The Global History of ‘Modernity’,A Response to a Reply,” Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient 41, 3 (1998), 299; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Hearing Voices: Vignettes of Early 
Modernity in South Asia, 1400-1750,” Daedalus 127, no. 3 (1998), 75–104; D.A. Washbrook, “Eighteenth-
Century Issues in South Asia,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 44, no. 3 (2001), 372–83; 
C.A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge,  1988); C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the 
Modern World, 1780-1914 (Oxford, 2004). 
have a comparative conversation with one another. Without them we are left with a 
set of arguments, even within South Asian history, unable to speak to one another, 
and instead have no way to construct a general narrative on a large scale about the 
recent human past. 
This article is a thought experiment in the construction of a clear, singular 
concept of modernity which can survive the death of modernisation theory’s 
unilinear Eurocentric narrative, but which does offer a framework for thinking 
about social change over the last four hundred years. It argues that a unitary 
concept of modernity is necessary to connect changes in one part of the world with 
those of another. The idea of modernity is only useful if it is defined in more or less 
the same way everywhere. But it suggests that such a concept only makes sense if it 
is used to describe a limited range of phenomena. In any place where something 
can be identified as modern, other, non-modern processes occurred which can’t be 
described with the term. The concept of modernity can never describe the totality of 
any set of human phenomena. Modernity always exists, indeed relies on, non-
modern forms of life. There can never be a people or society becoming fully 
modern. One can talk of certain practices and institutions as being modernised (the 
army, or the law, for example). But it makes no sense to talk about a teleological 
process of modernisation in general. 
What does this singular, post-modernisation theory concept of modernity look 
like? In its most basic sense, modernity posits a ruptural relationship with time. 
Modernity is a concept which describes a self-conscious break with what went 
before, particularly with traditional forms of legitimation that occur in the practices 
of specific local environments. With their clean lines and abstract patterns, modern 
institutions aspire to generality and universality. Those creating modern institutions 
can, of course, try to assert the need to return to earlier, purer worlds; this was of 
course, the first meaning of the word revolution. But such a move is an attempt to 
find authority somewhere outside local practices of the immediate, recent past. In 
whatever form they take, modern institutions govern by trying to separate people 
from the particular worlds they inhabit in their own time. Modernity can only ever 
be limited and partial because individuals have no choice but to exist in the finite 
circumstances of a particular temporal and spatial environment, which modern 
claims try to deny.5 
To develop this argument, we need to be clear here about the kind of concept 
modernity is. First, contrary to many accounts, our concept is not primarily 
philosophical or concerned with the history of ideas. Our aim, indeed, is to separate 
intellectual history from the history of practical institutions, offering an account of 
modernity which focuses purely on the latter. Our purpose is to challenge the 
tendency for intellectual history to become a master discipline, capable of 
explaining what occurs in other, supposedly lesser sub-fields. Philosophically-
minded scholars often refer to the thought of particular great thinkers to define the 
essential characteristics of modern ways of life. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and 
Georg W. Hegel are common candidates. The effect to root the history of 
modernity in the work of a small number of thinkers is understandably attractive to 
intellectuals. But it poses unnecessary questions about how ideas are transmitted 
and put into operation, and presents modernity as something which has a pure form 
which exists in the minds of a few Europeans, in contrast to more complex 
derivative realities.6 
Instead, the concept we propose is a tool for the empirical investigation of forms 
of practice. It describes how people do things rather than how they think about 
things. It is concerned in particular with how institutions are organised. 
Specifically, modernity consists of a set of practices and techniques which organise 
human interaction through abstract, de-personalised categories and generic forms. 
In place of face-to-face interaction and the particularities of local contest and 
obligation, modern institutions create anonymous systems which attempt to bring 
all transactions ‘regardless of distance, into a single frame of analysis and action’, 
as James Vernon puts it. Modernity’s characteristic forms are the printed manual, 	  5 For a discussion of non-linear modern time see Faisal Devji, “Apologetic Modernity,” Modern Intellectual 
History 4, 1 (2007), 61–76. 6	  The	  best	  examples	  of	  this	  approach	  are	  Charles	  Taylor,	  Sources	  of	  the	  Self	  (Cambridge,	  MA,	  1992)	  and;	  Charles	  Taylor,	  A	  Secular	  Age	  (Cambridge,	  2007),	  199.	  Taylor	  does	  not	  see	  ideas	  as	  causes,	  but	  does	  argue	  that	  social	  practices	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  examining	  the	  systematic	  beliefs	  they	  encaspulate.	  Works	  on	  South	  Asian	  history	  which	  understand	  western	  modernity	  through	  philosophy	  include	  the	  classic	  works	  Partha	  Chatterjee,	  The	  Nation	  and	  Its	  Fragments.	  Colonial	  and	  Postcolonial	  Histories	  (Princeton,	  NJ,	  1993)	  and	  	  Dipesh	  Chakrabarty,	  Provincialising	  Europe.	  Postcolonial	  Thought	  and	  Historical	  Difference	  (Princeton,	  NJ,	  2000).	  
the Post Office, the bureaucratic form, the revenue survey, the legal code, the price 
series, the irrigation system, the globally-exchangeable commodity, the census, the 
ballot box. None of these can be explained better by reference to a coherent 
philosophical system. Each are tools, employed by individuals to achieve a variety 
of purposes, although they are part of a common effort to create some kind of 
systematic regularity in a world of dispersed and individualised conduct. Rather 
than being reduced to phenomena in other realms of activity – ideas or culture, for 
example - they need to studied on their own terms.7 
Second, our concept of modernity is epochal, in that there are periods of time 
when modern techniques and institutions proliferated more than others. One can 
certainly identify the moment when the effort to rule through abstract and de-
personalised categories emerged in a particular place. One can also, in some places, 
identify the demise of such attempts. Modernity has a before: it may also have an 
after. One can perhaps talk about modern times, speaking of a period of time in 
which practices and institutions with modern characteristics particularly powerful 
and important, and perhaps also capture the elite and even public imagination. Yet 
it is wrong to consider modernity as defining everything about an era or age. 
Modern institutions are only ever one of many characteristics in a society at a given 
point in time. Even when modern forms extend into every sphere of activity, they 
exist alongside – indeed rely on – non-modern forms of life 
Thirdly, modernity is a singular condition, but it had many different points of 
origin. On a large scale, modernity was produced by practices and institutions that 
emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and were concerned in 
particular with the government of distant strangers. Modern forms of rule were 
created by elites, in particular, in their attempt to exercise power over wide spaces, 
over large land masses and oceans. Modern practices emerge from multi-authored 
processes of pragmatic, local decision-making, not from revolutions in the world of 
ideas or the transformation of purely economic forces. Precisely because it is 
concerned to make things generic, repeatable and abstract, modern practices are 
	  7 James Vernon, Distant Strangers: How Britain Became Modern (University of California Press, 2014); Jon E 
Wilson, The Domination of Strangers: Modern Governance in Eastern India, 1780-1835 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
always produced iteratively, not by the command of a single intellectual centre or 
sovereign power.  
Yet there is something about modernity that allows its denizens to imagine they 
are part of a system of power which might have had a single starting point, and 
single point of power. By reducing the particularity of local social phenomena to 
generic forms (converting use value into quantified exchange value, local juridical 
practices into textual law) modern practices enable those in the commanding 
heights of the modern state and capitalist economy to imagine that individuals are 
governable across large distances. Modern institutions work by creating the illusion 
of totality. It is, unfortunately, an illusion which too many scholars have been 
seduced by.8 
In fact of course the abstract systems which modern institutions try to govern 
with (the price series or the legal code, for example) can never escape what Ashis 
Nandy calls ‘the dirty imprint of life’. Modern institutions mildly alter some forms; 
they radically reshape others. But the dirt always clings on. Alongside abstract 
forms of rule, life within modern institutions is shaped by long-term ecological 
processes, by networks of market exchange which don’t subjugate the traffic in 
goods to a single set of prices, by the forms of political obligation and affiliation 
which endure in institutions that rely on face-to-face contact, by family relations, by 
the affective states of individuals including pride, honour, their fear of humiliation 
and violence. The trajectory of none of these can be explained by a narrative 
concerned only with the theme of modernisation.9 
It isn’t simply that those who rule with modern institutions make over-ambitious 
claims about their own power. The argument here is that modern institutions are 
constituted by their very limitation. They create an illusion of order because they 
control only certain kinds of things, particularly those material processes that can 
be manipulated from a distance. Of course, for that illusion to work those who 
operate modern institutions need to claim an unrealistically broad vision. For 
example: to do their job, officials administering the permanent settlement in 
colonial India needed to imagine that every form of landed interest in India could 	  8 My account here is indebted, of course, to the argument about sovereignty and power in M. Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality, Vol. I, Introduction (Harmondsworth, 1984). 9 Ashis Nandy, ‘India: State, History and Self’, The Little Magazine 1, no. 3 (2000), www.littlemag.com/. 
be reduced to the category of ‘zamindar’; or that the relationship between the state 
and landholder could be reduced to lines in revenue account books. Irrigation 
engineers needed to believe that a district’s local economy could be controlled by a 
government-built series of waterworks. Most likely though, everyone knew that 
these claims were not true and understood implicitly real life was more complex.  
Here, it isn’t just that modernity, in India at least, is Janus-faced, as David 
Washbrook argues. It is constituted by a kind of double-think, in which its actors 
claim to wield a form of power they know they do not possess. Modern institutions 
can do little on their own; their very distance from the uneven fabric of everyday 
life means they rely on non-modern forms of life to exist and to act. Even the least 
locally embedded commodity, whose price is constituted by the abstract force of 
the global marketplace, has a use value in the specific life of a particular person; 
modernity did not create India’s demand for cotton clothes, for example. Similarly, 
codes of law, revenue accounts, and numerical addressing systems treat people as 
abstract, inter-changeable categories; but they rely on forms of affective, inter-
personal relations between people to operate. As we’ll see in this article, modern 
practices spread and are supported by archaic forms of violence, relying on notions 
of honour and heroism that long precede their emergence. Similarly, charismatic 
leadership is not absent from modern institutions. Bureaucrats have friends too. 
Finally, the point we need to emphasize here is that the concept of modernity is 
only meaningful if it is a limited, indeed attenuated category. To be useful, the idea 
of modernity needs to restricted to those practices with which people try to rule 
with generic and abstract categories, and which mark a break with the continuities 
of the present and immediate past. A wider definition encompasses phenomena that 
can’t be identified as peculiarly modern and in so doing would prevent modernity 
from being a stable analytical category. 
That mean that our definition excludes phenomena that many would identify as 
characteristic of the modern age, many forms of military violence, in particular the 
violence of conquest. Of course many aspect of war were modernised in Europe 
and elsewhere from the seventeenth century onwards. Armies began to be imagined 
as organisations which deployed generic and inter-changeable tools of violence, all 
at the disposal of a rational centre of command concerned to advance a 
dispassionately calculated set of interests. Yet both the causes and the real 
experience of war continued – indeed continues – to be dominated by non-modern 
structures and attitudes. Archaic but long-lived ideas about heroism, respect and 
honour have often been vital to the decision to deploy force, and then in shaping 
how it is exercised, particular in imperial environments. We need to return to 
Joseph Schumpeter’s argument that empires do not expand as the result of rational 
processes of acquisition. They develop by fusing modern techniques with affective 
impulses from earlier epochs, particularly with the irrational desire to display 
martial success for its own sake, in particular in situations where honour seemed to 
be under attack. Often, as we shall see in this article, imperial violence was driven 
by what Schumpeter called ‘an atavism’ of individual, psychological habits of 
emotional habits’.10 
But our account of modernity’s necessarily limited and attenuated character 
means though that we need to challenge the liberal teleology underpinning 
Schumpeter’s argument. Schumpeter’s story is another version of the totalising 
story of modernity’s eventual future triumph. His use of the word ‘atavism’ implied 
that the archaic irrationality of imperial violence would be suppressed eventually by 
the peaceful power of modern liberal institutions. But atavism will always be with 
us. The particular forms of imperial violence which Schumpeter discussed may 
have disappeared, but other non-modern ways of life endure in an ever-changing 
relationship with modern practices which it is our task as historians to trace and 
understand. To reiterate, the limits of modernity are established by the character of 
modern institutions themselves: modernity is a concept which can only be used to 
describe practices which can be rendered abstract and general, and obviously many 
cannot take that form. It cannot dissolve ‘all that is solid into thin air’, as Marx put 
it, because in even the most ‘modern’ context life depends on practices that remain 
grounded in local and particular material life. The history of modernity’s 
emergence is only ever a history of the partial domination of modern institutions in 
particular places at particular moments in time. 
The history of modernity is then, to a large part the history of its own relationship 
with phenomena which cannot be assimilated by its own logic. The fate of modern 
institutions depends on precisely how they articulate their relationship with the 
relational, particular, contextual and visceral: with things and processes which 	  10	  Joseph	  Schumpeter,	  “The	  Sociology	  of	  Imperialisms,”	  in	  Imperialism	  and	  Social	  Classes	  (New	  York,	  NY,	  1951),	  65	  
cannot be generalised or translated into an abstract form. Perhaps – I don’t have the 
space here to do more than assert a possibility – societies which 1950s sociologists 
once championed as having successfully modernised are those where modern 
techniques of rule were smoothly able to assimilate the non-modern ways of life it 
relied on. By contrast, the poverty and conflict of the imperial and post-imperial 
world emerged from a much more tense relationship between the two.  
The remainder of this article is concerned with one such history. It traces the 
emergence of modern techniques of rule in the long-commercialised, now relatively 
prosperous region which surrounds the Godavari River delta at the centre of India’s 
eastern, Andhra coastline. Practices introduced in the 1790s marked a rupture in the 
way social relations were organised. But, the introduction of modern institutions to 
Godavari depended on a range of archaic practices and social forms. As we’ll see, 
the failure of British administrators to incorporate many of those forces placed their 
regime in crisis, and pushed the region into famine. 
Coastal Andhra is one of the regions upon which David Washbrook began his 
research and has focused on throughout his career. The argument here draws 
heavily on Washbrook’s sophisticated account of agrarian relations in ‘wet’ 
southern India. However, the argument also draws on Washbrook’s approach to 
studying social change in South Asia, an approach one might characterise as anti-
holistic. From ‘Country Politics’, to his more recent emphasis on the ‘conditions 
making possible India’s passage to its own distinctive modernity’, Washbrook 
emphasises the existence of multiple orders of historical phenomenon. For him, 
ideas and political actions are important, but they are always articulated in social 
contexts that cannot be reduced to a single culture or set of beliefs. At the same 
time, there is no single social force which acts as a master category either, merely 
different layers of social practice which each move to rhythms of their own.11 
 
In the different phases of his work Washbrook has used this methodologically 
pluralist approach to challenge efforts to scholars to reduce complex historical 
phenomena to monolithic and holistic categories of analysis. Never willing to 
downplay the impact of empire, Washbrook has nonetheless consistently 
challenged the claim that imperialism is a concept which explains every aspect of 	  11 David Washbrook, “Reviews,” History Workshop Journal 38, 1 (1994), 256–58.. 
nineteenth or twentieth century South Asian society.12 Similarly, his approach 
disaggregates the cultural totalities which more anthropologically-oriented scholars 
sometimes use to understand social change in South Asia. Against approaches 
which give explanatory power to holistic structures of representation, Edward 
Said’s Orientalism for example, Washbrook is concerned with dispersed, 
contradictory and multi-layered systems of practice. If, later in his career, 
capitalism became his master concept, it is a ‘system	  or	  process’	  that	  is	  ‘inherently	  conflictual	  and	  changeful,	  incapable	  of	  realizing	  or	  of	  stabilizing	  itself’,	  which	  ‘operates	  through	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  social	  relations	  of	  production	  and	  exploitation,	  which	  are	  themselves	  in	  constant	  transformation.13 
By contrast with a holistic, cultural approach to modernity, Washbrook’s style 
reminds one of the work of Fernand Braudel, with its emphasis on things happening 
in different orders of historical time. ‘Historical relations and developments’ are 
‘multilateral’ as Washbook puts it in. ‘History, like power, does not flow in only 
one direction’. Culture, political organisation, administrative institutions, systems 
of commodity exchange and ecology are all different kinds of phenomena that 
intersect but unfold on different timescales. It is, for example, worth noting that 
Washbrook was an early exponent of environmental history, an approach which 
presupposes the importance of long-term changes. But the significance of the 
physical environment does not detract from the connected but separate importance 
of political or economic institutions. 
Applying Washbrook’s approach to think about the concept of modernity, we can 
see that it only belongs to one particular sphere of human action: those techniques 
of governance which are capable of reducing social life to generic, material forms. 
Necessarily, modern institutions are built from and surrounded by pre-modern 
practices in contiguous spheres of activity, whether forms of economic exchange 
based on strong community identities, the skills and strong shared sentiments of 
scribal groups, forms of face-to-face sociability. Modern techniques of rule are an 
attempt to create a clear break with what went before; they mark a real rupture, but 	  12	  David	  Washbrook,	  “South	  India	  1770-­‐‑1840:	  The	  Colonial	  Transition,”	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies	  38,	  3	  (2004),	  479–516;	  David	  Washbrook,	  “Economic	  Depression	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  ‘Traditional’	  Society	  in	  Colonial	  India	  1820-­‐‑1855,”	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Historical	  Society,	  Sixth	  Series,	  3	  (1993),	  237–63	  13	  Rosalind	  O’Hanlon	  and	  David	  Washbrook,	  “After	  Orientalism:	  Culture,	  Criticism,	  and	  Politics	  in	  the	  Third	  World,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	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  and	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  34,	  1	  (1992),	  150.	  
a rupture in a limited sphere of activity. But even in its most extreme, accelerated 
form, it relies on non-modern forms of life that it can never annihilate. As Bruno 
Latour famously argued, ‘we have never been modern’.14 
 
The Violent Beginning of Godavari’s New Regime 
A part of the wealthy, ‘wet’, rice-exporting region of coastal Andhra, the region we 
are concerned with in this article covered the area around the last hundred miles 
before the Godavari river spills into the Bay of Bengal, halfway down the arc of 
coastline between Bengal and Cape Comorin. Godavari district (now divided 
between East and West Godavari) is a Telugu-speaking area ruled by the Qutb 
Shahi rulers Golconda kingdom from Hyderabad from the late sixteenth century 
onwards. Throughout most of the seventeenth century, the Golconda regime 
attracted and relied on a diverse group of warrior-aristocrats to keep order and 
collect revenue as deshmukh of each pargana. Some of these leaders were 
descendants of the Gajapati dynasty from Orissa, which briefly conquered the 
region but was then a source of elite migrants moving back and forth, enticed by the 
region’s productivity. Others were from local elite families who’d lived in coastal 
Andhra for centuries. All gave themselves themselves the status title Reddi, a word 
connoting a sense of leadership on a local scale.15 
In other parts of India (Bengal and Arcot, for example), the dominance of 
warrior-aristocrats had been eclipsed by scribes and traders in the early eighteenth 
century. In Godavari they remained prominent until the British arrived. The 
conquest of Golconda in 1687 had brought Godavari under Mughal rule. But, by 
the time the Mughal regime turned to administering the region, the empire’s 
Deccan wars had depleted its resources. Emperor Aurangzeb sent nawabs to the 
region to pressure Godavari’s warrior-aristocrats to pay more in tax, but chiefs 
resisted and won. The result, as J. F. Richards suggests, was that power and money 
were conceded to ‘rebellious sardars and rajas’; the Mughals were forced to turn 
their warrior enemies into autonomous friends. Profiting from the Andhra coast’s 
links with regional and international trade and its rich ecology, these ‘newly 	  14 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard University Press, 1993). 15 Cynthia Talbot, Precolonial India in Practice. Society, Region, and Identity in Medieval Andhra (New York, 
2001), 181–186. 
emergent’ leaders expanded their domains through a combination of local 
patronage and violence at the expense of other local centres of power.16 
As the capacity of the central Mughal bureaucracy to command waned in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, the semi-autonomous chieftaincies of the Godavari 
region came under the rule of the increasingly autonomous Nizams of Hyderabad. 
In 1758, Godavari was one of the five northern districts belonging to the Nizam 
ceded to the English East India Company in return for British military support in 
war against the French and Marathas. Their transfer to the Company was confirmed 
by the firman given by the Emperor Shah Alam II to Robert Clive in 1765. Late 
eighteenth-century officials thought they were the only lands in India (apart from 
‘the zemindary of Benares’) possessed by the British ‘in free, avowed, undivided 
sovereignty’.17 The Company’s initial interest in the region was built on pre-
imperial networks of production and monetary circulation, particularly on the 
Company’s effort to tap into textile production at the industrial town of nearby 
Machilipatam; on what I’ve suggest is misleadingly called India’s ‘proto-
modernity’. The Company’s limited power depended on its place in local networks 
of political allegiance and dependence, particularly on its exercise of the powers of 
regional sovereignty through the use of its army. But the initial thirty years of 
Company rule left the configuration of local politics at a sub-regional level 
undisturbed. Authority lay with a handful of fortified villages scattered throughout 
the district, where a handful of Reddi warrior-aristocrats held sway over a 
commercial society. In the early Company days these leaders paid tribute to nawabs 
who continued in position after the end of the Nizam’s rule, and then to British 
revenue committees in either Machilipatam or Madras. In each case, chiefs 
periodically travelled to negotiate and pay at the centre of regional sovereign 
power, returning to manage land and cultivate their retinues with little 
interference.18 
	  16 J.F. Richards, ‘The Mughal Retreat from Coastal Andhra’; James Grant, ‘Political Survey of the Northern 
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Before 1793, Godavari’s chiefs offered revenue in return for British armed 
support; violence was central to the relationship. For example, in the late 1780s 
leadership of the Polavaram estate on the south-west bank of the Godavari river 
was disputed amongst the three great grandchildren of the first chief. Polavaram 
was ruled by a family of Gajapati warlords who had migrated from Orissa in the 
seventeenth century. By the 1790s the dynasty had fractured, and Company officers 
in Machilipatam decided to back one of the sons, Mangapati Deo Reddi. This was a 
political decision, no different from the kind of choice which would have been 
made by the Company’s Mughal and Nizamat predecessors as to which local 
notable to back in a succession struggle. The choice was based simply on the 
Company’s belief that Mangapati was the man best able to secure them a stable 
source of revenue. The ‘zamindar’ struck a deal in which he would pay revenue in 
exchange for receiving the Company’s help against the rival claims of his siblings 
and his mother. East India Company troops were sent from the neighbouring fort of 
Ellore. Polavaram’s inhabitants were directed to obey Mangapati, or else ‘be 
considered as traitors and rebels’. For a few years the deal stuck.19 
Historians of seventeenth and eighteenth century South Asia, David Washbrook 
included, sometimes describe the social and political world which the East India 
Company encountered in the first years of its expansion in India as ‘proto-modern’. 
India – and coastal Andhra was no exception - before the British empire possessed 
a complex commercial society, in which high levels of literacy existed alongside 
political formations able to nurture market transactions on a large scale. A trading 
gentry, a scribal-bureaucratic elite, and a vibrant world of commodity exchange 
emerged in the quarter millennium before invasion Europe transformed the pattern 
of Indian politics. And, clearly, British imperial power relied on social elites and 
commercial relationships which preceded conquest. 20 
Yet, phrases such as ‘proto-modern’, even perhaps ‘early modern’ imply a 
genealogical connection between pre-imperial and imperial forms of rule. They also 
down-play the contribution made by scholars of this period to our understanding of 
	  19 Mallikarjuna Rao, “Native Revolts in the West Godavari District, 1785-1805” (PhD, Andhra University, 2000), 
128; Grant, “Political Survey of the Northern Circars,” 664. 20 For example, in David Washbrook, “South India 1770–1840: The Colonial Transition,” Modern Asian Studies 
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the distinctiveness of seventeenth and early eighteenth century Indian commerce 
and politics. Instead of being seen merely as the pre-history of the modern proper, 
we need to trace the prosperity and political order of the period in its own terms. 
We’ve argued that only a limited concept of modernity, as the attempt to govern 
with abstract and general categories, allows it to be defined clearly enough to have 
practical use in historical scholarship. Assessed on the basis of that concept, was 
nothing modern about how the way the Mughals exercised power. 
We need, in other words, to understand Mughal India as different from British 
India without defining it as incompletely presaging the latter. Perhaps the most 
important marker of difference was the relationship between money and accounting 
categories, and local practice. Monetization is often seen as the classic instance of 
modernization, as it seems to impose values from outside particular social worlds. 
However in India before British rule, money and writing connected but did not 
subordinate distinctive worlds of identity and social practice. Perhaps the most 
important sign of this was the existence of different currencies, and multiple 
weights and measurements in areas theoretically ruled by a single sovereign. In 
Andhra, gold coins from the Vijayanagara empire circulated throughout territory 
ruled by the neighbouring rival Deccam sultanates, even after the former’s collapse. 
Land and revenue rights were bought and sold, but there was no idea of a single 
price extending across time and space.21 As Frank Perlin argued, forms of 
accounting and record-keeping were used to link rather than subordinate different 
social orders. Early modern India ‘lacked’ practices of governance that attempted to 
rule difference by dominating it with homogenous and depersonalised norms. If the 
modern state and capitalist economy rely on the subordination of social life on such 
abstract forms – the spread of the modern state’s modular knowledge or capitalist 
property relations – early modern India possessed neither. Yet these absences did 
not preclude relative prosperity. Living standards in early eighteenth century India 
were not significantly lower than those in Europe. Perhaps we need to revise our 
account of the institutional preconditions of economic growth.22 	  21	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The point is that the Mughals and their contemporaries possessed a political 
culture that valued and nurtured the skill of managing difference without 
annihilating particularity and distinction. Indeed, as a number of historians have 
argued, the preservation of distinction, and the maintenance of a balance between 
different interests and communities was perhaps the dominant Mughal ethos.23 This 
was a world of networks not systems, of ‘connected histories’ in which the place of 
the intermediary and the broker were critical. It was, particularly, a political culture 
which continued to value face-to-face contact and physical proximity. These 
networks were linked by nodal points, military camps, religious centres, darbars, 
kachcharis, in which dispersed individuals gathered to come into the ‘presence’ of 
one another for short or long periods of time, and sovereigns were able to meet their 
subjects. They allowed the construction of powerful effective polities, able to 
integrate most of the Indian subcontinent into their usually accommodating systems 
of power. Yet, they relied on a way of doing politics dramatically different from 
modern techniques of rule concerned to impose abstract and general categories on 
the complexities of reality. 
To some extent, more or less in different places, the East India Company’s 
growth in the third quarter of the eighteenth century relied on their ability to operate 
within this sophisticated but non-modern political culture of movement and 
negotiation. In Godavari, the symbiotic relationship between landholders like 
Mangapatti Deo Reddi and the Company depended on travel, physical proximity 
and negotiation between the landholder and British officers at Macchilipatam. But 
within a short space of time, the British began to think this style of political 
alliance-making was not regularly remunerative enough to sustain their power. The 
Company’s failure to extract resources from the northern sarkars overlapped with 
war and fiscal crisis throughout the Company’s South Asian territories, which 
themselves overlapped with the broader political and moral crisis of empire that 
accompanied the loss of the thirteen North American colonies. Anxieties about the 
security of the Company’s possessions caused the London-based Court of Directors 
to direct the Committee of Circuit to tour the northern sarkars in 1776, investigating 	  23 Nandini Chatterjee, “Reflections on Religious Difference and Permissive Inclusion in Mughal Law,” Journal of 
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and tabulate ‘the state’ of the region including the number of inhabitants, state of 
manufactures, revenue, land rights and fortification. This was a sufficient change if 
political style to cause one member, George Mackay, to resign.24  
The 1776 inquiry was intended to create a body of knowledge that would allow 
the Company to offer a series of ‘fixed’ and regular ‘leases’ to landholders, 
guaranteeing the Company’s stability and income. Eventually, after debate and 
political turmoil, the Company decided to create a series of fixed revenue 
settlements with landholders, following the decision made in Bengal in 1789 with a 
similar move in the northern sarkars in 1793. The settlements were declared 
permanent in 1793 and 1801 respectively.25 
In both Bengal and the permanently-settled south, the new regime was supposed 
to reduce the give and take governing the interaction between the Company and its 
subjects. Instead, the relationship with local leaders was converted into a series of 
fixed financial transactions, regulated by the flow of paper between the Collector’s 
office and the Board of Revenue in Madras. The Mughal idioms which the 
Company unwitting operated depended on governors making political judgements 
about who was likely to uphold their power and who was not. British officers 
supported Mangapati because they thought he was more likely to support the 
Company’s regime than his siblings. The new system removed the need to make 
judgements about friends and enemies. British officers no longer needed to take 
sides in local disputes. They merely to impartially administer fixed, written 
processes. The need for movement was eliminated too. Instead of being governed 
by an occasionally travelling committee based at the region’s administrative centre, 
the Company’s power was channelled through individual officers dispersed 
throughout the northern sarkar’s second tier of towns. On the Godavari river delta, 
a district Collector arrived with a small retinue of Indian officers and remains of 
stationary and regulations in 1799, marking both the imposition of bureaucratic 
power and the retreat of the Company from being a political protagonist in 
Godavari’s local society.  
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Instead of being political subjects with whom the Company could negotiate, the 
Company’s new revenue-collecting system redefined landholders collecting as a 
sources of revenue and the possessor of a physical asset. They were treated as 
neither friends nor enemies; they were merely a static line in British ledger books, 
which the Board of Revenue in Madras imagined could be manipulated from a 
distance. So, for example, when in 1799 floods diminished the productive capacity 
of the Polavaram realm, the Mangapatti Deo Reddy’s plea to remit the payment of 
revenue was quickly dismissed by the Board of Revenue in Madras. The new rules 
insisted that landholders who didn’t pay revenue promptly to the Company would 
have their landed assets sequestrated and sold; replacing the name of a non-paying 
landholder with another in the Madras government’s revenue accounts. The role of 
the Collector was simply to execute instructions from far off. 
  
Benjamin Branfill, the first Collector of Godavari district, was a member of a 
major London mercantile family which was making the transition from trade to the 
imperial bureaucracy.26 But Branfill wasn’t imbued with the ethos of distant, 
abstract regularity which governed the Company’s new techniques of rule. In fact, 
his own attitude to political power clashed with the assumptions made by his 
superiors in Madras. He was keen to have some kind of standing in local society. 
He was interested in protecting his honour, using force to do so if need be. His 
language betrayed a strong sense of the legitimacy in late eighteenth-century 
imperial politics of an emotional, passionate response to local situations, in contrast 
to the cold regularity of the Board of Revenue. If Branfill was Godavari’s agent of 
modernization, he was not himself modern.27 
As a consequence, when faced with Mangapati’s refusal to pay revenue Branfill’s 
actions were vacillating and contradictory, stressing the need to conciliate one 
moment and violently dispossess him the next. In December 1798, Branfill seemed 
sympathetic to the landholder, arguing that the Company should ‘indulge’ him; the 
problem lay with Mangapati’s ‘adherents’, not his own attitude. Between March 	  26 For details of the family history see William Holman to Champion Branfill, November 1720, Essex County 
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and July the following year Branfill adopted a more aggressive stance. Captain 
Denton from the Madras army was sent to mediate, with little effect; ‘unless drastic 
action is taken against his contumacy the revenue of the Company will suffer 
greatly’, the Collector argued. But then, on 24 July, Branfill again urged a more 
conciliatory attitude, suggesting that the Board of Revenue in Madras agree 
Mangapati’s proposal to reduce the tax he paid on teak wood-cutting. Branfill’s 
approach was governed by the threat Mangapati presented at any point in time, 
compared to the number of Company troops in the area. He was most conciliatory 
after the landholder had arrested and imprisoned one of the Company’s Indian 
revenue officials. He was most aggressive when Company troops were present in 
the district. 
The end of war between the East India Company and the state of Mysore freed 
troops who could be deployed to impose British power over Godavari’s recalcitrant 
zamindars. There was nothing systematic about their use. Following the fall of 
Sriringapatam in May 1799 and its short, violent aftermath, a battalion of the 
Bengal Marine marched through Godavari in March 1800 on its way back home, 
and Branfill persuaded their commanding officer to deploy them against 
Mangapati. Paranoid as ever, Branfill ‘was unwilling that they should advance too 
rapidly, lest their approach would alarm the zemindars of Polavaram’, and allow 
them to collect their own armed retainers and fight the British. Mangapati did learn 
about the impending attack, but fled, to the nearby Papi hills, instead of fighting.28 
Even though the source of danger had been removed, Branfill’s sense of honour 
dictated that a battle take place, and Mangapati be defeated by force. So, he ordered 
soldiers to set off in chase. When Mangapati couldn’t be found, the Company’s 
troops sought targets in the plains, engaging in a frenetic effort to destroy the Raja’s 
power there. Branfill idea of sovereignty was only be satisfied if the violent power 
of British sovereignty in a spectacular fashion. He wrote to Madras asking for 
permission to execute rebels on the spot. His request was turned down. 
Nonetheless, the houses of supporters on the plains were burnt down and 
Mangapati’s allies rounded up. In one incident, a Brahmin who had ‘intrigued with’ 
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the landholder was pushed into a boat full of his social inferiors, and felt so 
humiliated by failure to recognise his status he committed suicide.29 
Branfill’s cathartic violence may have helped British power endure through fear 
in Godavari, but it also ended the Collector’s own career. The incoming Governor 
of Madras conducted an inquiry into the Polavaram crisis and found that marching 
soldiers into the hills was an action ‘to the destruction of the health of the soldiers 
and to the degradation in the eyes of the inhabitants of a military reputation’. The 
Company’s policy, Lord William Bentinck said, should always be ‘to reclaim by 
gentle methods’, and be careful of ‘the religious prejudices’ and ‘ordinary customs 
and manners’ of ‘the natives’. Branfill’s anxious, violent response to the limitations 
of modernity in Godavari led him to be investigated in London. Frustrated by the 
attack on his reputation, he quit before he was sacked, and returned to Britain.30 
 
These statements nicely illustrate the doublethink, the hypocrisy if you like, 
which the effort to reduce landholding to a homogenous system of modern rules 
involved. The Company’s system created an illusion of order in Madras, based on 
the transmission of revenue rules and the letter’s about the smooth functioning of 
the new Collector’s office in Rajahmundry. Yet those institutions were unable to 
sustain the new order without being supplemented by forces operating according to 
a very different logic, particularly by the punitive violence unleashed by Branfill. 
Branfill behaved as a frightened warrior not as a modern revenue officer; but then 
the rules which framed the permanent settlement outlined no procedure to be 
followed when landholders with large bodies of armed retinues refused to obey the 
Company’s orders. Modernity could only be introduced to Godavari as a graft onto 
spectacularly un-modern forms of authority and power. 
One consequence, then, of the effort to control rural Godavari by reducing social 
action to systematic, written bureaucratic practices was the escalation, but also de-
legitimisation, of local violence. Force, and violent disorder, were pushed to the 
fringes of zones supposedly regulated by systematic rules. In Rajahmundry, as the 
new governmental approach worked its way out in different ecological zones, that 	  29 Collector of Rajahmundry to Board of Revenue, 27 Octover 1800, Godavari DR, 934, pp.45-6; Instructions to 
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involved the creation of a stark distinction between the rice-cultivating lowland and 
the heavily wooded Papi hills. Before the permanent settlement, these highlands 
were part of landed estates which straddled plains and hills. They were a source of 
teak and military personnel, as hill-dwellers provided armed retinues for the plains 
Rajas, recruited through hill chiefs. The management of their relationship with the 
hills was central to warrior-aristocrats like Mangapati Deo’s local leadership. The 
men who took their place trying to govern rural Godavari’s social relationships 
failed to establish the kind of political authority able to incorporate leaders who the 
British described as ‘hill rajas’. The result was a process of effective partition and 
retreat, as the hills were abandoned to what the British saw as savagery and 




The modernisation of Godavari’s political institutions saw the quick fall of its 
peasant-warrior dynasties, and the rise in their place of a local elite whose power 
was based on employment by the East India Company. The dominant ethos of local 
leadership moved away from the martial charisma of the warrior to the pacific 
virtues of the trader and scribe. Brahmans thrived, in particular, who could could 
rely on hereditary skills cultivated through generations as accountants, scribes and 
record-keepers. These groups managed record rooms and collected revenue; they 
also took over landed estates when warrior lords were dispossessed by the new 
British rules. The process of change in the early years of Company rule saw the rise 
of the same scribal social groups who became more important in many parts of 
India during the eighteenth century before the British rise: scribal and mercantile 
men, often Brahman, Kayastha or Khatri, had displaced warrior elites in Maratha 
territories, in Bengal and in Arcot.31 The difference, however, was that the rise of 
pacific, scribal social groups to positions of leadership was accompanied by a 
vehement critique from precisely the British officials who relied so strongly upon 
them. According to Company servants at the time and scholars since, Godavari’s 	  31	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passage into modernity was marked by the failure of this group to conform to 
modern standards required by employees of public authority. Instead, according to 
these accounts, they retained greater loyalty to local interests than to the norms of 
the modern state and thus allowed ‘corruption’ to be rife. As a British officer 
writing from the neighbouring district wrote in the 1850s, ‘in every district … the 
whole body of public servants form a combination, bound together by strong ties of 
interest … to maintain abuses’.32 
The most common explanation emphasises the cultural gap between local Indian 
ways of doing politics and the East India Company’s regime, stressing the partial, 
incomplete and limited power of the latter. R.E Frykenberg saw the persistence of 
local interests as a sign of the failure of the centralised imperial state to sufficiently 
modernise India. Frykenberg was writing in the hey-day of state-led development in 
the 1960s. He had, after all, worked as a research assistant for Albert Mayer, the 
architect tasked by Jawarharlal Nehru to develop a system of ‘village planning’ to 
transform rural India.33 In his work on Guntur district he argued that that 
combinations of Deshastha Brahmans in the neighbouring district to Godavari acted 
as a destabilising ‘anti-state’ force which ‘disperses its power and proliferates itself 
to the detriment of the State’. With a less celebratory account of the possibilities of 
modern state power, Ranajit Guha and other subalternists argue the persistence of 
localism is a sign of the British regime’s dominance without hegemony; its success 
in materially subjugating India without sharing its ruling norms and ideologies.34 
Similarly, the political scientist Sudipta Kaviraj drew a contrast with between the 
centralising, rationalist force of the western state and the local vernacular idioms 
the British were forced to concede to. Like Frykenberg and Guha, Kaviraj notes 
‘the self-limiting impulses of the colonial state’, arguing that unlike European 
absolutist states, colonial rule was incapable of dissolving all competing claims to 
political authority, or condensing all the functions of social and political regulation 
into the institution of the state. The ‘colossal structures of colonial ‘rationalism’ had 	  32 Robert Eric Frykenberg, “Traditional Processes of Power in South India: An Historical Analysis of Local 
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  Albert	  Mayer,	  Pilot	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  Etawah,	  Uttar	  Pradesh	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feet of vernacular clay’, as Kaviraj famously puts it.35 
These different analyses ignore the extent to which all regimes in the ‘modern’ 
west as much as imperial or post-imperial India, need local agents who build their 
own authority separately from the machinery of central power. Any central 
bureaucracy can only govern so much. Central political authorities rely on the 
coordinated actions of groups of people they cannot directly control and who seek 
legitimacy from ‘local’ sources as well as their connection to the central sovereign. 
Those actions take different forms. Sometimes, they exist in legally constituted 
spheres of local administration to which power is devolved, as in the federal United 
States or nineteenth-century British counties and boroughs. Even in supposedly 
centralised Napoleonic Europe, government worked through elected local officials 
and councils. Until the late nineteenth-century, France was a nation of dispersed 
peasants with powerful ‘centrifugal’ forces into. Key to modern government in 
most places was the fusing of property-ownership and administrative or political 
office at a local level; in England, until the late nineteenth century most of the 
functions of the state were carried out by local landowners acting as Justice of the 
Peace, or members of an increasing numbers of local boards. We forget how small 
the institutions of the nineteenth-century central state were; and how crucial to its 
operation was the public recognition, often even the active cultivation of forms of 
local leadership which had autonomous lives of their own.36 
Late eighteenth or early nineteenth century India was peculiar not, then, because 
of its central British state created a ‘minimal order’, and adopted a policy of 
‘studied non-interference in the social institutions of the country’. It was different 
from Europe because it failed to publically and actively enlist social forces outside 
the very narrow confines of state administration in governing society. British-­‐‑ruled	  India	  was	  remarkable	  for	  the	  near	  total	  absence	  of	  any	  strata	  of	  local	  government	  until	  the	  late	  nineteenth-­‐‑century,	  for	  example.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  1919	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  municipal	  and	  district	  boards	  were	  elected	  by	  any	  kind	  of	  popular	  vote.	  Even	  in	  the	  permanently	  settled	  lands	  of	  Bengal	  and	  Andhra,	  the	  	  35 Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Crisis of Political Institutions in India,” Contributions to Indian Sociology 18, 2 
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political	  authority	  of	  landholders	  was	  challenged	  and	  curtailed	  during	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century.	  The	  British	  frowned	  on	  the	  fusion	  of	  property-­‐‑holding	  and	  governental	  office	  which	  was	  vital	  for	  local	  political	  power	  elsewhere.	  As	  many	  historians	  have	  recognised,	  government	  relied	  on	  the	  British	  working	  with	  local	  Indian	  agents,	  of	  course.	  But	  the	  British	  regime	  was	  reluctant	  to	  formally	  acknowledge	  the	  role	  of	  local	  leaders	  in	  the	  imperial	  constitution.	  	  The	  result	  was	  that,	  in	  Godavari	  at	  least,	  the	  only	  route	  to	  local	  political	  authority	  came	  by	  working	  in	  the	  Company’s	  offices.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  Indian	  officials	  simply	  as	  manipulative	  schemers	  using	  their	  official	  position	  for	  private	  gain,	  the	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  use	  the	  full	  range	  of	  their	  connections	  to	  build	  a	  position	  of	  local	  leadership.	  They	  were,	  in	  other	  words,	  concerned	  with	  status	  and	  authority	  not	  just	  cash.	  But	  the	  British	  even	  disavowed	  any	  political	  connection	  with	  their	  own	  ‘native’	  officers,	  regarding	  them	  as	  no	  more	  than	  functionaries	  whose	  task	  was	  to	  mechanically	  obey	  rules	  and	  commands.	  In	  practice,	  their	  failure	  to	  construct	  an	  effective	  alliance	  with	  indigenous	  elites	  dramatically	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  power.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  forms	  of	  local	  authority	  needed	  for	  the	  government	  to	  work	  atrophied;	  with	  them,	  the	  prosperity	  of	  the	  local	  economy	  collapsed.	  
We can trace this process by looking at the careers of two officials. First, Jaggaya 
Kocherlakota, a locally-born Telegu officer who worked for both the East India 
Company and the Polavaram Rajas collecting revenue and marshalling armed men. 
Jaggayya had been Branfill’s most trusted official and confidant. He was a vital 
source of information about local society when the Collector first arrived to the 
district. Branfill was accused by his superiors in Madras of letting his partiality for 
Jaggaya cloud his judgement during the conflict. It was Jaggayya who reconnoitred 
Polavaram fort, and then directed troops during the British army’s attack and chase 
into the hills. 
After Mangapati Reddy had been driven to the hills by Benjamin Branfill’s army, 
Polavaram passed quickly from one landholder to another. No-one was able to get 
sufficient grip on local agrarian resources to pay revenue consistently to the 
Company, until Jaggaya bought it in 1813. Jaggaya paid Rs 43,210, ‘money [that] 
was certainly made somewhat too rapidly’ to have been made by the rules, 
according to a British officer. But unlike his predecessor, Jaggaya had not have the 
money or skill to impose his authority on the local countryside. The Company’s 
refusal to negotiate about how much revenue was paid each year, and its effort to 
limit the landholder’s capacity to give revenue-free grants of land curtailed 
Jaggaya’s capacity to build authority through patronage. Jaggaya tried to tried to 
enlist support by building temples on the plains of Godavari. But, in the two 
decades in which he retained control of the estate, its size and influence shrank. 
Jaggaya’s position was continually resisted by one-time subjects of Polavaram 
living in the hills. After a brief effort to control the hill-tracts themselves, the 
upland regions of Godavari were written-off by the British as a realm of un-
disciplined wildness, until more aggressive forestry policies arrived in the ate 
nineteenth century. With no funding for irrigation work and little money advanced 
to cultivators during difficult economic times, Jaggayya’s lands became less 
productive. Nonetheless, the new Raja, as he styled himself, lived on in until old 
age.37 
Jaggaya’s career shows that diistrict officers could not help but rely on existing 
networks of local officers and landholders to collect taxes and maintain some kind 
of local order. But, this reliance was intermittent, and was constantly disavowed. 
Much of the time, local leaders were trying to be clients of a British regime which 
did not want to act as a patron. They were also trying to project a quasi-autonomous 
public role in a world where the British thought the Company’s bureaucracy was 
the only legitimate authority. 
The career of a second officer illustrates this latter point. Singari Venkataram 
Paupiah was a scribe and translator from a relatively low-born Telegu Brahmin 
family. By the 1790s he’d climbed his way to being the officer in charge of the East 
India Company’s relationship with the estate of an estate ruled by another family of 
Andhra warrior-aristocrats, Mugalturru, on the right bank of the Godavari river near 
the coast. As darogah of the Company’s kachchari at Mugalturru, Paupiah 
presented himself as a rigorous and ‘severe’ collector of revenue, an efficient agent 
of the bureaucratic logic of British imperial collection. Yet a bureaucratic position 
	  37 N.W. Kindersley, Collector, to Board of Revenue with Attachments, 13 May 1824, AP State Archives, 
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involved public authority too; Paupiah attempted to exercise power by building 
local relationships and exercising patronage. 
At its height, the Mugalturru estate was said to have 2-3000 dependents, and an 
‘open choultry’, where rice was distributed daily to all travellers.38 But the old 
warrior-aristocrats of Mugalturru were dispossessed in similar circumstances as 
their neighbours at Polavaram. As the East India Company’s rigid new revenue 
settlement came into force, Boppiah Tirupati Raju, the lord of Mugalturru, pleaded 
with British officers to treat him as the friend he imagined he had been to the 
Company for the previous 20 years, and to remit revenue. The Company refused. 
Boppiah’s delayed revenue payments caused the dispossession of his estate. Like 
his neighbour at Polavaram, the Raja of Mugalturru fled to the nearby hills with a 
band of supporters, quickly to die in exile. The Company took over administration 
of the estate, appointing Paupiah acting as manager and chief revenue collector. 
With Mugulturru divided and no patriarch, Paupiah tried to fill the vacuum and 
impose his own authority on the neighbourhood. But Boppiah’s three widows 
challenged his role, trying to assert their own public power over the estate. In a 
stream of letters to the Collector, John Reid, they accused Boppiah of 
embezzlement, and also of ‘venting his malignity upon those who had the 
misfortune to offend him or did not know the road to his friendship’. His greatest 
crime though, was to publically assert his status, ‘putting himself on a footing of 
equality with [the Raja’s wives] by eating with them).39 
A long tradition of writing described this kind of conduct as the typically 
nefarious actions of an Indian official taking advantage of the weakness of the 
British regime for their own private gain. The early nineteenth century novelist Sir 
Walter Scott, castigated a man like Paupiah as ‘[t]he artful Hindu, master 
counsellor of dark projects, an Oriental Machiavelli, whose premature wrinkles 
were the result of many intrigues, without scruples, to attain political or private 
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advantage.’ Scott’s friend David Haliburton had been ousted from Madras by a plot 
involving a relative of Paupiah.40 
Yet this critique, which continues to this day, fails to recognise the often public-
facing actions of supposedly corrupt local officers. Men such as Jaggaya and 
Paupiah were not engaged in purely private intrigue for personal gain; they were 
trying to build local forms of political power, no doubt for their own egotisic 
reasons but satisfaction came from something more than the accumulation of 
money. Their actions were not hidden away beyond closed doors. They took place 
in public. Paupiah publically pushed himself forward as an equal of the Mugalturru 
widows, visibly eating with the family. His financial transactions with the estate’s 
tenants took place in a public situation. Paupiah claimed his allowance from the 
East India Company wasn’t enough to live off on (certainly not at the status he 
claimed), so he needed ‘to live off the countryside’. To raise money, Paupiah had ‘a 
ceremony at his house’. As the Collector, John Reid noted, ‘the custom of giving 
presents and even asking them on occasions is universal’. Paupiah’s only 
‘deviation’ from custom was to name the sum he expected from each renter. Reid 
didn’t have a good enough grip on the estate’s accounts to work out how much 
Paupiah had gained: ‘so artfully he has conducted himself, that ‘scarcely any charge 
can be brought home to him’, ‘much must be left to conjecture’. Nonetheless, at 
one event he reported that Paupiah gained 500 pagodas, none of which was paid in 
secret but publically handed over by his subjects or tenant. Strikingly, none of those 
who paid were amongst the petitioners who complained against the diwan. 
Paupiah’s friendship was something Mugalturru’s renters thought was worth paying 
for. Instead, allies of the Mughalturru widows reported him to the Collector. 
Paupiah did not see the authority he was building in these ‘ceremonies’ as a 
challenge to British power. Paupiah’s power partly relied on his connection to the 
Collector to buttress his own independent authority. When he arrived to the district, 
the Collector complained that Paupiah ‘immediately gave it out that I should be his 
friend (altho’ I have never seen him) and that he should soon get the better of his 
enemies’. Reid, however, disavowed the connection, presenting himself as a neutral 	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figure with no commitment to one side or another in Godavari’s society. The 
Collector insisted to the widow’s agent that he ‘was by no means a friend of 
Paupiahs, and that he would find me ready and willing to make an impartial 
investigation into the different charges’ against him. 
In the chaotic political conditions which followed the permanent settlement in 
Godavari, Paupiah’s aim was to create a sort of local Anglo-Indian regime. His 
polity was based on his management of local patronage downwards and an upward 
connection with the Company’s higher authority; perhaps the latter was rooted still 
in the idea of the Company as the Mughal representative in the region, perhaps 
simply in British military force. The construction of this new kind of political 
organisation, for Paupiah, depended on alliance-building, on friendship as well as 
both violence and bureaucratic rule. By contrast, the British representative in the 
district anxiously asserted his desire to treat everyone as a stranger: to govern 
individuals as members of generic, abstract categories. British officers emphatically 
disavowed the idea that power depended on friendship and alliance-building. For 
John Reid and his colleagues, political power relied on the cold modern logic of 
bureaucratic authority alone. 
A similar disavowal characterised British rule throughout the permanently settled 
districts of India for the next fifty years, from Bengal to the southern fringes of the 
northern sarkars. It was a disavowal that had a number of consequences. First of all, 
the denial of relational commitments with Indians gave the British a sort of 
strategic openness. The British evasion of friendship allowed them to appear all 
things to all people, and them to avoid a negative response from enemies of allies. 
John Reid’s disavowal of any friendship with Paupiah blocked opposition from 
Paupiah’s enemies to the Company’s fairly fragile authority in the district. Evading 
commitment, constantly deferring the moment at which they needed to come down 
on one side or the other, was a way for the British to maintain their position and 
retain some kind of grip on power. 
Yet, that evasion also meant their attempt to actually get anything done was 
limited. The price of the East India Company’s strategic openness was its limited 
reach into the Indian countryside. With no allies, the Company found revenue 
collection difficult, and staggered from one fiscal crisis to another. It was unable to 
limit violence any more than was needed to prevent its own limited, core 
administrative functions from being attacked. By all accounts, the early nineteenth 
century in the permanently settled districts was a period of crime, dacoity and 
endemic violence. The Company’s persistent refusal to take sides in local battles 
meant disputes lingered and conflict was unresolved. The British regime did no 
more than respond to events in a chaotic and ad hoc fashion.  
Paupiah’s own story ended in failure. His jerry-built authority quickly vanished, 
and others took his place in the chaotic carousel of local power which characterised 
the first thirty years of life in the Godavari region after the permanent settlement. 
Paupiah fell for the simple reason this his enemies were better organised than he 
was. Petitions against him arrived at the Company’s kachchari towards the end of 
1799. At the point, John Reid’s reassurance that he was ‘willing to make an 
impartial investigation into the different charges’ was disingenuous. Paupiah was 
too vital a component of the local administrative regime to be brought down by a 
few accusations of corruption; and the consequences of an investigation too 
dramatic. The first petitioner, a renter named Gotaty Subiah, had called for the 
collection of rent to be suspended while an inquiry into the accounts of villages in 
Mugalturru was made. Such a move would have created too great a loss in the 
Company’s revenue. Considering the short term interests of the Company, John 
Reid decided to dismiss the charge, arresting the petitioner for making 
unsubstantiated allegations. But the campaign against Paupiah picked up, with the 
widows and their agent getting involved. Reid was evasive, refusing to give ‘a 
definite opinion about the individuals’ to the Board of Revenue, blaming his own 
ignorance of the area he had been posted to rule. Eventually the agitation of 
significant numbers of renters in Mugalturru, as well as the ruling family made 
some kind of action necessary to maintain peace and the Company’s finances. By 
the beginning of 1800, Paupiah had become so worried about his personal safety 
‘he was afraid to sleep, two nights in the same room’. Eventually Reid responded to 
pressure from the Mugalturru widows and their allies, and Paupiah was arrested and 
sacked from his post. But the Mugalturru widows didn’t win their battle for power 
either. Within a short space of time, the estate was dismembered and sold, too.41 
 
The Collapse of Political Leadership and Economic Decline 
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Modernity arrived in Godavari as the negotiated political relationships between 
governors and local power-brokers were reduced to a set fixed and non-negotiable 
contract between the East India Company’s supposedly unitary government and 
propertied subjects. That story is a very familiar one. But the usual narrative forgets 
the extent to which modern governments usually incorporate and rely on non-
modern forms of affiliation and practice. The peculiarity of modern government in 
early nineteenth-century India was the emphatic way these archaic elements were 
disavowed and suppressed compared to other contemporary societies. 
Modern governance consists of the effort to rule strangers with generalities and 
abstractions. But I’ve suggested that patron-client relations, the cultivation of local 
political followings through charismatic leadership, the assertion of power based on 
status and community rather than rational interest or national-sentiment, all remain 
vital to the way in which modern states are organised throughout the globe, to the 
supposedly ‘developed’ west as much as supposedly ‘developing’ world. The 
unwillingness of the East India Company’s regime to stitch together its ruptural and 
abstract techniques of rule with practices rooted in local familiarity caused the 
region’s social breakdown. The events we’ve described in this chapter were 
followed by an economic crisis. The argument here is that this crisis were caused 
by the East India Company’s effort to impose a modern structure of rule, based 
purely on the manipulation of abstractly conceived entities, without creating an 
alliance with the non-modern social forces which preceded its arrival in southern 
Indian society.    
One sign of this collapse was the demise of institutions able to offer physical 
protection, and with it an increase in Godavari’s vulnerability to outside attack. 
Before the permanent settlement, the authority of the region’s warrior-aristocrats 
relied on their occasional use of force, and their capacity to call in assistance from 
allies higher in the political hierarchy, including the East India Company. In the 
early 1800s the armed forces which had been kept by the region’s old warriors were 
dispersed. The Company had only a small retinue of locally-based troops. During 
these years, the Company’s conquest of central India severed the bonds which 
connected groups of armed men to political formations, particularly to Maratha 
states. The destruction of the financial and affective bonds which bound warrior 
communities together allowed more disorganised violence to proliferate. In March 
1816, groups of pindari horsemen with a loose connection to insurgent Maratha 
states rode through the region to plunder. The collapse of Godavari’s political 
structures meant there were not enough organised armed men to defend the region. 
The 130 soldiers on duty in Rajahmundry were enough to defend the town’s tiny 
British population, but no more. To protect themselves, well-to-do Indian residents 
of the town and surrounding areas fled temporarily to the hills.42 
Similarly, the newly fissile and weak leadership provided by regional landholders 
failed to keep the physical infrastructure that maintained the productivity of the 
local economy functioning, most importantly to regulate the flow of water. Until 
the early nineteenth century, the prosperity of the region was maintained by a de-
centralised network of canals that channelled water flowed through the River 
Godavari into rice-fields. Embankments stopped excess water from destroying 
crops; waterways directed water to sustain the growth of paddy. These were 
managed by local warrior-chiefs, as part of their attempt to maintain a local 
population which could fight if need be. But the collapse of chieftaincies by the 
mid-1820s meant that support for infrastructure had collapsed. Reports written by 
British officials in 1844 and then 1852 criticised the ruinous state of irrigation 
works. Works had ‘not been kept in an effective state’. Irrigation channels were so 
full of reeds water only flowed during the very highest floods.43 
The decline of pre-imperial structures of local leadership caused a collapse in the 
region’s human and physical infrastructure which itself rendered the Company’s 
position fragile. Subject to recurrent violence and declining agrarian productivity, 
British officers struggled to maintain the stable collection of revenue. In fact, 
during the first two decades of the 1800s, the East India Company stayed solvent 
because of its creative accounting, by counting income received from the sale of 
land not the taxation of agriculture and other productive processes. Between 1803-
1812, 11% of the Company’s revenue demand was met not from the collection of 
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rents, but ‘from the capital of strangers from other districts’, buying up estates in 
the vain hope they could bring them into profit. Of course few were able to.44 
A succession of flood years and poor harvests peaked with the great famine of 
1832-3. Serious dearth occurred in 1838. Local officers calculated that the 
population of Godavari district declined from 738,000 to 561,000 between 1821 
and 1842, through a combination of death and migration.45 A lush, fertile region 
capable of sustaining high levels of agrarian production with some limited 
coordination, Godavari lost peasant labour to the much less productive soil of the 
dry interior region governed by the Nizam of Hyderabad. Critically for the East 
India Company, British officers finally started to note a fall in revenue collections, 
from Rs 18.7 lakhs to 13.7 lakhs between 1821 and 1838. By 1840, the decline in 
the region’s revenue collections led the Company to act, and a commissioner was 
sent to investigate and write a series of proposals to make the district’s revenue 
yield recover.46 
The details of the government’s response is beyond the scope of this article. In 
short, though, the Company’s failure to integrate local, pre-British idioms of 
authority into the structure of public power caused an intensification of British 
efforts at ‘modernisation’. If the permanent settlement was an effort to govern a 
society of strangers without engaging in the negotiations which local political 
commitments might entail, the public works projects which followed the Godavari 
famine were an effort to rule without engaging with people at all. Henry 
Montgomery’s complex report into the causes of famine recommended the 
construction of a state-sponsored irrigation system. The response to a collapse of 
governmental authority over people was to impose the East India Company’s power 
directly over the region’s natural resources.47 
 	  44 Henry Montgomery to Chief Secretary, Fort St George, 18 March 1844, IOR P/280/44, 2191; G. N. Rao, 
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Montgomery’s report led to the appointment of Arthur Cotton as engineer in 
charge of a new wave of irrigation works, with the sole aim of increasing the ability 
of the East India Company to collect its revenue demand. Cotton constructed an 
anicut (barrage) across the Godavari River a mile south of Rajahmundry, which 
then fed into an elaborate canal system to irrigate the delta with a stable flow of 
water. His system drew on both existing canals, and pre-British techniques for 
cheaply building a large dam. Strikingly though, Cotton’s project was framed as 
another bold break with the past, and a disavowal of the importance of old 
waterworks. Like earlier attempts to introduce modern forms of governance such as 
the permanent settlement, Cotton’s irrigation system relied heavily on existing 
structures and archaic social forms; but, just like the architects of those reforms, 
Cotton disavowed his dependence on the past.  
Rajahmundry was, Cotton stated, ‘entirely without any general system of 
irrigation, draining, embankments of communications’. There were some ‘old 
works’, he disparagingly said, ‘but their complete restoration is not what the district 
needs’. Just as with the permanent settlement forty years before, the solution lay 
with the British state imposing a ‘new system with the lone, unilateral force of its 
own power.48 
The myth of the Godavari region is that that is exactly what happened. From 
famine and emigration in the 1830s, by 1900 the area became one of the most 
prosperous areas of the southern India. The town of Rajahmundry has recently 
opened one of the few museums to celebrate the life of a British imperial official, 
and statutes of Sir Arthur Cotton are scattered through its traffic intersections. In 
fact though, as David Washbrook’s early work demonstrated, the prosperity of the 
wet regions of southern India were based on the revival of dense patterns of local 
organisation, with the expansion of newspapers, district and taluq associations, co-
operatives and, eventually, elite Indian involvement in local administration. 
Perhaps, and this is only a hypothesis, Godavari’s later prosperity relied on the 
existence of spaces for local power-brokers to create authority which had been 
disabled earlier, and were absent elsewhere.49 	  48 Cotton, ‘Report on the Irrigation of the Rajahmundry District’, 22 August 1844 I Copies of Letters of Major 
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Yet the history of these new, late nineteenth-century forms of local Indian 
leadership is not one of straightforward ‘collaboration’ with the imperial state. 
Rajahmundry was a centre for late nineteenth-century nationalism. It became a 
focal point for agitation during the swadeshi movement in 1907. It was the site 
chosen for a series of speeches by the Bengali nationalist Bipin Chandra Pal, for 
example. The combination of support for modernist projects and rejection of the 
brute fact of imperial domination should not surprise us. Early twentieth century 
Indian nationalism claimed it could modernise – explicitly using that word - India 
without annihilating the local, affective bonds which it believed bound its 
compatriots together. It castigated what it saw as the violent materialism of western 
imperialism. But it rarely did so in the name of a rival homogenous culture, seeing 
modernity instead as a series of practices which had different lives in different 
environments. As I’ve argued in this article, those are arguments which might be 
usefully taken seriously now. 
